Fort Pickens and the Start of the War

Fort Pickens, in Pensacola, Florida, was the other major U.S. fort in the seceded states that was still under U.S. control.  Braxton Bragg was in charge of the confederate forces outside the fort, and there was a truce of sorts in effect there, but not an official one.  Neoconfederates often accuse Lincoln of violating a solemn agreement by reinforcing Fort Pickens, but he didn’t violate any solemn agreement.

There was no real armistice, only an informal arrangement.  Kenneth M. Stampp called it a “quasi armistice.”  The Buchanan administration, in the wake of secession winter, had ordered the reinforcement of Fort Pickens:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, January 21, 1861. [Capt. ISRAEL VOGDES,]. First Artillery, Fort Monroe, Va. : SIR: You are designated to embark with your company on board the sloop-of-war Brooklyn to re-enforce Fort Pickens, of which you will become the commander as well as of other forts and barracks which it may be in your power to occupy and defend with the co-operation of any naval commander or commanders at hand, although it is understood that Fort Barrancas and probably Fort McRee are already in the hands of the seceders. It is probable that the Brooklyn may be obliged to land you outside the harbor, but it is hoped not so far from Fort Pickens as to be beyond the protection of its guns if the debarkation should be opposed. Of course, the company will be first landed to cover the supplies which are intended for the fort,. The Brooklyn will touch at Key West. Deliver the accompanying letter to Captain Brannan, and desire him to communicate freely with Major Arnold, who sailed eight days ago from Boston to occupy Fort Jefferson, giving him intelligence of your movement, and the intention to re-enforce both Forts Taylor and Jefferson with a company each, hoping and believing that the latter is in the possession of the major. The General-in-Chief, by whose direction I write, has every confidence in the zeal and ability of the officers of the First Artillery. I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant, L. THOMAS, Assistant Adjutant-General. P. S.–You are to understand that you are not to attempt any reoccupation or recapture involving hostile collision, but that you are to confine yourself strictly to the defensive. L.T. P. S.–The guns, &c., if it has been found possible to get any on board, are intended for Fort Jefferson. L. THOMAS.

[OR Series I, Vol 1, p. 352]

“On January 28, Senators John Slidell of Louisiana, Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia, and William Bigler of Pennsylvania handed the President [Buchanan] a telegram from Senator Stephen R. Mallory of Florida.  This dispatch tendered a pledge, endorsed by Mallory, that Pickens would not be assaulted if reinforcements were not landed.  Buchanan, more anxious than ever to prevent conflict now that the Peace Conference was about to assemble, sought the advice of his cabinet.  Every member, plus General Scott (though he later denied it), favored accepting the proposal and establishing what would actually constitute a military truce.  Holt and Toucey then sent a joint order to Lieutenant Slemmer and the various naval officers instructing them to keep the artillery company on board the Brooklyn–‘unless said fort shall be attacked, or preparations shall be made for its attack.’  Provisions were to be transferred to the garrison; the troops and naval vessels were to remain near by.  ‘You will exercise the utmost vigilance, and be prepared at a moment’s warning to land the company at Fort Pickens. … ‘

“Thus the Federal government was reserving the right to land supplies and to keep on hand adequate reinforcements and naval protection.  But since the secessionists made no hostile movement, the government forces did not increase the size of the garrison.  This ‘quasi armistice’ still prevailed at Fort Pickens at the time of Lincoln’s inauguration.”  [Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came:  The North in the Secession Crisis, 1860-61, pp. 105-106]

Mallory was the driving force behind this “agreement:”

PENSACOLA, January 28, 1861. To Hon. JOHN SLIDELL,  or, in his absence, Hon. R. M. HUNTER, or Governor BIGLER: We hear the Brooklyn is coming with re-enforcements for Fort Pickens. No attack on its garrison is contemplated, but, on the contrary, we desire to keep the peace, and if the present status be preserved we will guarantee that no attack will be made upon it, but if re-enforcements be attempted, resistance and a bloody conflict seem inevitable. Should the Government thus attempt to augment its force–when no possible call for it exists; when we are preserving a peaceful policy–an assault may be made upon the fort at a moment’s warning. All preparations are made. Our whole force–l,700 strong–will regard it as a hostile act. Impress this upon the President, and urge that the inevitable consequence of re-enforcement under present circumstances is instant war, as peace will be preserved if no re-enforcements be attempted. If the President wants an assurance of all I say from Colonel Chase, commanding the forces, I will transmit it at once. I am determined to stave off war if possible. Answer promptly. S.R. MALLORY.

[OR Series I, Vol 1, p. 354]

“In fact, a gentleman’s agreement had been concluded between the Buchanan administration and the Florida authorities at the end of January.  The circumstances were these:  the Buchanan administration had sent the Brooklyn and other warships with men and provisions for Fort Pickens, and the Floridians had prepared to forestall the expedition by assaulting the fort. The terms of the agreement, which at the last minute had averted a clash, were the following:  the state batteries would withhold their fire, and the Union squadron would land provisions but not the men, who were to remain aboard the Brooklyn.  At any time, however, the men would be landed if the fort should be attacked, ‘or preparations made for its attack.’  Since the end of January the truce had grown more and more precarious, with the Floridians working feverishly to bring additional firepower to bear on Pickens, and with the Federal ships hovering ominously offshore.”  [Richard N. Current, Lincoln and the First Shot, p. 47]

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1861. To JAMES GLYNN,  commanding the Macedonian; Capt. W. S. WALKER, commanding the Brooklyn, and other naval officers in command; and Lieut. ADAM J. SLEMMER, First Regiment Artillery, U. S. Army, commanding Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla.: In consequence of the assurances received from Mr. Mallory in a telegram of yesterday to Messrs. Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler, with a request it should be laid before the President, that Fort Pickens would not be assaulted, and an offer of such an assurance to the same effect from Colonel Chase, for the purpose of avoiding a hostile collision, upon receiving satisfactory assurances from Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase that Fort Pickens will not be attacked, you are instructed not to land the company on board the Brooklyn unless said fort shall be attacked or preparations shall be made for its attack. The provisions necessary for the supply of the fort you will land. The Brooklyn and other vessels of war on the station will remain, and you will exercise the utmost vigilance and be prepared at a moment’s warning to land the company at Fort Pickens, and you and they will instantly repel an attack on the fort. The President yesterday sent a special message to Congress commending the Virginia resolutions of compromise. The commissioners of different States are to meet here on Monday, the 4th February, and it is important that during their session a collision of arms should be avoided, unless an attack should be made or there should be preparation for such an attack. In either event the Brooklyn and the other vessels will act promptly. Your right, and that of the other officers in command at Pensacola, freely to communicate with the Government by special messenger, and its right in the same manner to communicate with yourself and them, will remain intact as the basis on which the present instruction is given. J. HOLT, Secretary of War. ISAAC TOUCEY, Secretary of the Navy.

[OR Series I, Vol 1, pp. 355-356]

There is one source that appears to put a more formal picture on the “quasi armistice:”

“Lieutenant Slemmer was still holding Fort Pickens there with a pocketful of soldiers, but the complexion of things had changed.  The United States men-of-war Sabine, St. Louis, and Macedonian had arrived off the harbor, and the Brooklyn was on the way with a company of regulars under Captain Israel Vogdes.  A powerful naval force was anchored there, just waiting.  Senator Stephen Mallory of Florida looked over the situation and possibly decided that these vessels were perfectly capable of steaming in and retaking the navy yard and forts the state had recently appropriated.  Mallory dispatched an urgent appeal to three friendly Senators in Washington proposing a truce at Pensacola:  He would pledge there would be no attack on Fort Pickens if the administration in turn would pledge not to reinforce the garrison.  This proposal was passed on to the President, who agreed to it despite his resolve to eschew all such pledges.  His ships could easily repossess the navy yard, but that would be war.  The Brooklyn was ordered to land supplies for Slemmer but no reinforcements, and to wait there with the other vessels, ready to repel any attack.  This was the peculiar ‘Fort Pickens truce,’ a truce favorable to the secessionists since by its terms the administration voluntarily agreed not to exercise its ability to retake bastions stolen from it.  Lieutenant Slemmer was left with a token force in a position similar to that of Major Anderson, with one notable exception:  There was nothing to prevent Slemmer from being reinforced should the truce be broken.”  [W. A. Swanberg, First Blood:  The Story of Fort Sumter, pp. 198-199]

“The exposed situation of Fort Pickens had become known to Lincoln, and one of his earliest official acts was to order its reinforcement from the fleet; but of the conditions of the January truce he was not informed.”  [John G. Nicolay, The Outbreak of the Rebellion, p. 51]

But there was no formal agreement whereby the Federal government pledged never to reinforce Fort Pickens as long as the confederates didn’t attack. Buchanan had made a personal “gentleman’s agreement,” and Buchanan didn’t have the authority to bind Lincoln to a “gentleman’s agreement.”  To such an extent that an agreement existed, the day Lincoln was inaugurated, the agreement was no longer in force.

The fort was resupplied with the intent of also landing troops.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, March 12, 1861. Captain VOGDES,  U. S. Army, On board U. S. sloop-of-war Brooklyn, lying off Fort Pickens : SIR: At the first favorable moment you will land with your company, re-enforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same till further orders. Report frequently, if opportunities present themselves, on the condition of the fort and the circumstances around you. I write by command of Lieutenant-General Scott. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[OR Series I, Vol 1, p. 360]

“But on April 6 a messenger arrived from Fort Pickens with the news that the troops had not disembarked, because a naval officer had denied that Scott’s orders could supersede those of the former Secretary of the Navy.  The President dispatched new instructions the same day, and the reinforcements landed at Pickens on April 12.”  [Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came:  The North in the Secession Crisis, 1860-61, p. 275]

“I have declined to land the men … as it would be in direct violation of the orders from the Navy Department under which I am acting.”  [Captain Henry A. Adams to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, 1 Apr 1861, quoted in Grady McWhiney, “The Confederacy’s First Shot,” Civil War History, Vol XIV, No. 1, March, 1968, p. 8]

“The [Navy] Department regrets that you did not comply with the … orders. … You will, immediately, on the first favorable opportunity after receipt of this order, afford every facility to Capt. Vogdes … to enable him to land the troops under his command [at Fort Pickens].”  [Gideon Welles to Henry A. Adams, quoted in Grady McWhiney, “The Confederacy’s First Shot,” Civil War History, Vol XIV, No. 1, March, 1968, p. 9]

Lincoln had never declared he would not reinforce Fort Pickens.  In fact, he had declared in his Inaugural his intention to “hold, occupy, and possess” the government’s property.

Meanwhile, back in Montgomery, Davis had already decided to violate the so-called “truce” himself:

“It is certain that by early March both Lincoln and Davis had decided to violate the truce, but neither knew what the other intended.  On March 10 General Braxton Bragg took command of Confederate forces near Pensacola with instructions from the War Department to report his ‘wants in respect to artillery and the munitions of war, having in view the … reduction of Fort Pickens.’ ”  [Grady McWhiney, “The Confederacy’s First Shot,” Civil War History, Vol XIV, No. 1, March, 1968, p. 8]

“Bragg had been less than honest with Adams.  Only insufficient means, not regard for the truce, prevented the Confederates from attacking Fort Pickens.  By the end of March Bragg commanded a force of 1,116 men, and five thousand additional troops were on the way to Pensacola, but he was not yet ready to fight.  He believed that the erection of a new battery at Pickens was ‘a virtual violation of the [truce] agreement; and the threat of President Lincoln in his inaugural is sufficient justification of the means we are adopting.’  But Bragg ‘deemed it prudent not to bring the agreement to an abrupt termination.’  The Union fleet off Pensacola was too strong, and he was still unprepared.”  [Grady McWhiney, “The Confederacy’s First Shot,” Civil War History, Vol XIV, No. 1, March, 1968, p. 8]

Well before the actual reinforcement of Fort Pickens, though, Bragg had received a letter from Davis saying:

“It is scarcely to be doubted that for political reasons the U.S. govt. will avoid making an attack so long as the hope of retaining the border states remains.  There would be to us an advantage in so placing them that an attack by them would be a necessity, but when we are ready to relieve our territory and jurisdiction of the presence of a foreign garrison that advantage is overbalanced by other considerations.  The case of Pensacola then is reduced [to] the more palpable elements of a military problem and your measures may without disturbing views be directed to the capture of Fort Pickens and the defence of the harbor.  You will soon have I hope a force sufficient to occupy all the points necessary for that end.  As many additional troops as may be required can be promptly furnished.”  [Jefferson Davis to Braxton Bragg, 3 Apr 1861]

As McWhiney writes, “This letter indicates that Davis was willing to start the war.  He would have liked to do precisely what [historian Charles] Ramsdell claimed Lincoln did–maneuver the enemy into firing the first shot–but the Confederate President considered such a scheme, in his own words, ‘overbalanced by other considerations.’  Davis counseled action–‘your measures may without disturbing views be directed to the capture of Fort Pickens’–and the tone of his letter implied that he expected Bragg to take the fort should he fire the first shot.”  [Grady McWhiney, “The Confederacy’s First Shot,” Civil War History, Vol XIV, No. 1, March, 1968, p. 12]

Jefferson Davis appears to have been determined to start the war no matter what.  If not at Fort Sumter, he was preparing to start it at Fort Pickens.