If you talk to Neoconfederates, they’ll claim that Lincoln maneuvered the confederates into firing on Fort Sumter because he wanted to get a war started.
In my view, the reality is that Jefferson Davis made the decision to fire on Fort Sumter because HE wanted to get a war started.
First of all, Jefferson Davis was not a fool, nor was he an idiot. He had a first-class mind with decades of political experience. A West Point graduate, a hero of the Mexican War, and a former Secretary of War, Davis did not take the issue of going to war lightly, and he wouldn’t make the decision to go to war on a whim, or simply because his pride was wounded. The viewpoint that Lincoln maneuvered Davis into firing on Fort Sumter presupposes a Jefferson Davis with no such intellectual abilities. It presupposes a master strategist Lincoln and a Davis with no strategic forethought or abilities at all. After all, the confederates had plenty of warning about the resupply effort from their commissioners, Crawford, Roman, and Forsyth, who were reporting back to Davis from Washington nearly every day.
Let’s look at the situation Davis was in. Secession had been stopped at seven states. The nascent confederacy was relatively tiny. “At the very least, as the most modest of the Southern imperialists envisaged it, the full-grown Confederacy would have to include Virginia, Maryland, and other slaveholding states of the Upper South and the border.” [Richard N. Current, Lincoln and the First Shot, p. 131] The Virginia convention voted 89-45 against secession on 4 April. “Thus, in early April, it appeared that (unless something drastic were done) the Confederacy was doomed to carry on, if possible, as a mere string of seven states, an aborted empire.
“What was worse, it appeared that, given time, one or more of the seven might abandon the Confederacy and return to the Union. If, in the lower South, true Unionists or ‘reconstructionists’ were few, they were nevertheless too numerous to suit the thoroughgoing, fire-eating secessionists. Especially in Alabama, the home state of the Confederate government, reconstructionism in one guise or another seemed a threat to Southern independence. The outstanding secessionist, William L. Yancey, a resident of Montgomery, had failed to win election to the Confederate Congress. In one Alabama town this ‘fire-eater’ had, in a sense, actually eaten fire: he had been burned in effigy. ‘We are in danger,’ the Charleston Mercury warned (March 25), ‘of being dragged back eventually to the old political affiliation with the states and people from whom we have just cut loose.'” [Ibid., pp. 132-133]
Time was not on their side. The Mobile Mercury said, “The country is sinking into a fatal apathy and the spirit and even the patriotism of the people is oozing out under this do-nothing policy. If something is not done pretty soon, decisive, either evacuation or expulsion, the whole country will become so disgusted with the sham of southern independence that the first chance the people get at a popular election they will turn the whole movement topsy-turvy so bad that it never on earth can be righted again.” [Quoted in Current, Ibid., p. 134]
In their Joint Resolution, the Virginia Assembly, without a single negative vote in both houses, said,
“JOINT RESOLUTION concerning the position of Virginia in the event of the dissolution of the Union. Adopted January 21, 1861.
“Resolved by the General Assembly of Virginia, That if all efforts to reconcile the unhappy differences existing between the two sections of the country shall prove to be abortive, then, in the opinion of the General Assembly, every consideration of honor and interest demands that Virginia shall unite her destiny with the slave-holding States of the South.” [OR Series IV, Vol. I, p. 77]
Virginia was on record as saying she would join the confederacy if and when a war started. Now, this was probably meant as a threat to the Lincoln Administration, but it showed what would happen in a war, and if a war started these gentlemen would have to make good on their threat or be exposed as mere bluff and bluster, thus losing face.
Davis had advisors who were urging him in that direction as well. L.Q. Washington wrote, “I fear the present Virginia Convention will not pass an ordinance of secession unless a collision or war ensues; then public feeling will force them to it. There is a majority of old Federal submissionists, who got in by pretending to be resistance men.” [OR Series I, Vol I, pp. 263-264]
“One Alabamian had warned Davis, ‘Unless you sprinkle blood on the face of the Southern people they will be back in the old Union in less than ten days.’ A sprinkle of blood, too, should bring the fencesitters–Virginia and the other border states–into the Confederate fold.” [W. A. Swanberg, First Blood: The Story of Fort Sumter, p. 286]
There are the words of Virginian Roger Pryor, who, speaking to a Charleston audience on April 10, 1861, said, “But I assure you that just as certain as tomorrow’s sun will rise upon us, just so certain will Virginia be a member of the Southern Confederacy; and I will tell your Governor what will put her in the Southern Confederacy in less than an hour by Shrewsbury clock. Strike a blow!” [Ibid.,_ p. 289]
That same day, Davis received a telegram from Louis T. Wigfall, urging, “General Beauregard will not act without your order. Let me suggest to you to send the order to him to begin the attack as soon as he is ready. Virginia is excited by the preparations, and a bold stroke on our side will complete her purposes. Policy and prudence are urgent upon us to begin at once.” [Wigfall to Davis, 10 Apr 1861, quoted in Richard N. Current, Lincoln and the First Shot, p. 151]]
In the cabinet meeting, Toombs warned Davis that firing on the fort would inaugurate the Civil War. Davis went ahead anyway and ordered the fort reduced. He’s not going to put into his order, “We need Virginia so I want you to fire on the Fort.” He’d have to be incredibly stupid to say something like that, and Davis was not a stupid man.
It was actually a good strategic move. It immediately brought 4 additional states into the confederacy, including, most critically, Virginia, and there had been a possibility of bringing a total of 7 in. Had all those 7 come into the confederacy, there would have been no way for the Union to prevail. Lincoln knew the border states were crucial. So did Davis. It unified the confederate populace and suppressed thoughts of Reconstructionism as they rallied around the confederacy. The malaise talk of March and early April ceased at once and was replaced with patriotic exhortations and renewed recruiting of young men into the army.
I think if we look at the total situation, the viewpoint that Davis ordered the firing on Fort Sumter to bring the upper south and the border states into the confederacy fits the entire situation, whereas the viewpoint that Davis was merely passively reacting to bold, brilliant strategic moves made by Lincoln until he finally had to attack because there was no alternative is a misrepresentation of Davis and does him a great disservice.
What do you think?
Student of the American Civil War 
I am on record thinking this is accurate, although a certain historian living in the far Southwest deserves the credit for forcefully bringing it to my mind.
This post is a decent but brief review of the evidence. Ever consider writing it up for something like the Monitor? I’d be willing to help if you needed it. (Serious suggestion and offer.)
Thanks, Jim. There’s quite a bit more to do on it. My thoughts on it were inspired by that same historian. 🙂
Great post. Was firing on Ft Sumter a good idea? First, it branded the Confederacy as the aggressor and united (mostly) the North. Second, was time on Lincoln’s side or Davis? Time would’ve given Davis more time to raise troops and money. Third, any invasion of the Confederacy would’ve sent VA/NC/Tenn/Ark to their side, so why not wait and let Lincoln invade? One can make arguments on either side, probably the best argument for not attacking is that the actual attack on Sumter led to a lost war.
Thanks for taking the time to comment. I’ll respond to each of your points in order:
“First, it branded the Confederacy as the aggressor and united (mostly) the North.”
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Davis doesn’t appear to have been worried about that, and neither did the upper south. Recall he got four of the eight upper south states. Lincoln himself said that to lose Kentucky would be to lose the whole game, and Kentucky was a close call. The confederacy appearing to be the aggressor doesn’t seem to have affected Kentucky. If the confederacy was large enough, it would have been too much for the Federals to combat.
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“Second, was time on Lincoln’s side or Davis? Time would’ve given Davis more time to raise troops and money.”
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From where, though? The problem was that support for secession was fading fast. As time went by, the confederacy looked to start losing states which would drop their support of the confederacy and reassert their loyalty to the United States.
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“Third, any invasion of the Confederacy would’ve sent VA/NC/Tenn/Ark to their side, so why not wait and let Lincoln invade?”
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Davis knew that Lincoln wouldn’t do so, as evidenced by his letter to Bragg, who was outside Fort Pickens at the time: “It is scarcely to be doubted that for political reasons the U.S. govt. will avoid making an attack so long as the hope of retaining the border states remains. There would be to us an advantage in so placing them that an attack by them would be a necessity, but when we are ready to relieve our territory and jurisdiction of the presence of a foreign garrison that advantage is overbalanced by other considerations. The case of Pensacola then is reduced [to] the more palpable elements of a military problem and your measures may without disturbing views be directed to the capture of Fort Pickens and the defence of the harbor. You will soon have I hope a force sufficient to occupy all the points necessary for that end. As many additional troops as may be required can be promptly furnished.” [Jefferson Davis to Braxton Bragg, 3 Apr 1861]
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“One can make arguments on either side, probably the best argument for not attacking is that the actual attack on Sumter led to a lost war.”
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That would actually be one of the worst, since the participants at the time would not know the outcome.
Toombs warning is a bit iffy. There is no official record of it and the first mention of it is after Toombs death and related by a son in law. It is a family tradition and in my mind suspect. As if OUR ancestor warned Davis about the unfolding disaster.
Thanks for the comment. It sounds like something worth investigating.
Hi Al I was wondering if you could comment on this statement by Jeff Davis:
“I directed a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter that we would abstain from directing our fire on Fort Sumter if he would promise not to open fire on our forces unless first attacked. This proposal was refused.”
Furthermore I was told:
Lincoln, alone, started the war by a surprise attack on Charleston Harbor with a fleet of warships, led by the USS Harriet Lane, to occupy Fort Sumter, a Federal tax collection fort in the territorial waters of South Carolina and then invaded Virginia.
I figured if anyone would be good to consult about this it would be you. Why do I often hear that Ft Sumter was a federal tax collection point. How is that not ridiculous?
I don’t recall that proposal, but let’s take a look at it as though it were fact. How could a commander of U.S. forces agree to such a proposal? What if supply ships were sent in and the confederates opened fire on those vessels? Anderson would have promised he wouldn’t fire on the confederates, meaning he couldn’t aid those U.S. ships. No responsible commander could ever agree to such a thing, and Jefferson Davis, being a West Point graduate, would have known that.
If Lincoln was launching a surprise attack, he obviously had no idea what surprise is, because he told the South Carolina governor what he was doing.
The first time I heard it claimed that Fort Sumter was a tax collection point was from Charles Adams, the author of the pack of lies known as When in the Course of Human Events. I refuted this book chapter by chapter on this blog in several posts. It’s ridiculous, of course. Fort Sumter wasn’t completed yet when Major Anderson occupied it. The tax collection point was the Customs House in Charleston, not Fort Sumter. People who make that claim have no clue what they’re talking about.
Thank you. So is that even something Jeff Davis said then or is it made up?
The quote comes from Davis’ address to the confederate congress on April 29, 1861. You can see it here: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_m042961.asp
I didn’t recall whether the proposal was actually made to Major Anderson or not, but as I said, no responsible commander would ever agree to it. Look closely at when Davis says the proposal was made. Davis was basically saying, “A relief expedition is on the way to help you, and we’re going to fire on it. If you promise not to help your fellow U.S. military personnel, we won’t fire on you.”
I’ve since located the proposal.
MONTGOMERY April 11, 1861
GENERAL BEAUREGARD: Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter. If Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that in the meantime he will not use his guns against us unless ours should be employed against Fort Sumter, you are authorized thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides to be the most practicable. L. P. WALKER
Here’s Anderson’s response, which as a responsible commander he was bound to give:
FORT SUMTER, S.C. April 12, 1861
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt by Colonel Chesnut of your second communication of the 11th instant, and to state in reply that, cordially uniting with you in the desire to avoid the useless effusion of blood, I will, if provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant, and that I will not in the meantime open my fires upon your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort or the flag of my Government, by the forces under your command, or by some portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile intention on your part against this fort or the flag it bears, should I not receive prior to that time controlling instructions from my Government or additional supplies. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, ROBERT ANDERSON, Major, First Artillery, Commmanding
Notice the differences in what Davis sent and what Anderson replied. Where Davis wanted Anderson to essentially commit treason, Anderson refused to do so.
In other words, Major Anderson made no promise that he was not authorized to make. He could not know if circumstances might dictate an obligation on his part under orders to fire upon the Confederate forces. So once again, this seems to be a disingenuous request on the part of Jefferson Davis.
Yes.
Thank you so much!!!!!
I am indebted to your research.
You’re welcome. In closing, let me point out that Anderson did pledge that as long as the rebels were not hostile to either Fort Sumter or any other U.S. forces, his guns would remain silent. That wasn’t good enough for the rebels.
It was Lincoln who sent the resupply mission to Fort Sumter, not Davis. Infact, it was impossible for Davis to start the war. If Lincoln hadn’t continued with his attempts to resupply forts within Confederate territory, then Davis would have had no reason to fire on Fort Sumter.
As usual, your incompetence and lying is manifest. Davis was the one who ordered the firing on Fort Sumter. He’s the one who started the war.