This book by Professor Steven Sodergren of Norwich University is a deeply researched look at Union soldiers and how the Overland and Petersburg campaigns affected them. He’s delved deeply into United States Army soldiers and their writings, both letters and diaries.
We learn, “There was arguably no bloodier time in American history than the months of May and June 1864. During this period, the vast, combined armies of the Union and Confederacy succeeded in slaughtering each other at rates never seen before or after in the long military saga of North America. This was the time of General Ulysses S. Grant’s great offensive, intended to finally choke off the Confederate cause by sending no less than five Union columns against strategic points in the South, ranging from the rebel capital at Richmond to the Red River valley in Louisiana.” [p. 14] As Professor Sodergren writes, “The Overland campaign was unlike anything that they [U.S. soldiers] had encountered before in their military service for the Union. The forty days spanning Grant’s first contact with Lee in the Wilderness on May 5 until the arrival of the first segments of the Army of the Potomac outside Petersburg on June 15 witnessed unprecedented levels of violence and movement by the opposing forces. Prior to this time, most campaigns in the eastern theater had been relatively short affairs, involving operational maneuvers punctuated by one large tactical engagement typically ending in Union defeat. Large lulls usually separated each of these engagements, such as those that followed the battles at Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg.” [p. 15]
Professor Sodergren gives us a useful table of Army of the Potomac casualties suffered during those 40 days:
The Wilderness, May 5-7 KIA 2,246 WIA 12,037 MIA 3,383 Total 17,666
Spotsylvania CH, May 8-21 KIA 2,725 WIA 13,416 MIA 2,258 Total 18,399
North Anna River, May 22-June 1 KIA 591 WIA 2,734 MIA 661 Total 3,986
Cold Harbor, June 1-15 KIA 1,845 WIA 9,077 MIA 1,816 Total 12,738
Cavalry Actions, May and June KIA 214 WIA 1,075 MIA 848 Total 2,137
TOTAL KIA 7,621 WIA 38,339 MIA 8,966 Total 54,926 [p. 19]
We begin to see effects early in the campaign. “Spotsylvania would be the peak of men documenting their fascination with the violence of the battlefield. As the unfamiliar became familiar, and the horrors of the battlefield became more of an everyday experience rather than an occasional trauma, the men registered a growing sense of desensitization by reducing their commentary on what surrounded them.” [p. 42]
The violence wasn’t the only hardship the soldiers endured. “In addition to the constant exposure to the elements and the lack of fresh water, many Union soldiers were forced to subsist without rations for extended periods of time as the logistical network of the Army of the Potomac proved inadequate for the pace and conditions of the Overland campaign. It was not that there was not enough food to go around; by this point in the war the Union supply system was in full swing. Instead, the near continual movements by the Army had supply wagons scrambling to keep up with the soldiers while still remaining far enough behind the lines to be secure from enemy forces. … The worst supply breakdowns occurred at the end of May and in mid-June, when the army was undertaking more rapid marching to get ahead of Lee’s men at Cold Harbor and Petersburg, respectively.” [pp. 48-49]
A number of factors affected soldier morale, especially one in particular. “One issue that always seems to arise when discussing the morale of fighting men is mail. The frequent interruptions in the supply of food would have contributed to corresponding interruptions in the supply of mail, had mail delivery to the Army of the Potomac been allowed in the first place. Immediately prior to the start of the spring campaign, General Grant ordered a temporary halt to the delivery of mail to the Army of the Potomac, most likely to free up roads and horses for support of the southern movement. The men noticed immediately, and often commented on the decline in mail calls. … It was this lack of contact with the home front that greatly added to the corrosive elements of the campaign. The interruption in the army’s mail service would last anywhere from a week to a month, depending on the unit and its location, and the effects would eventually have an effect on the men. At the exact moment that these men sought reassurance from those they loved in order to remind them of what they were fighting or, that tenuous link was severed.” [p. 50] All of this accumulated to have profound effects on the soldiers. “Taken with the intermittent pitched battles and the near constant exposure to enemy attack, the forced marches, excessive heat, and unreliable supplies of food, water, and mail only served to further degrade the fighting ability and morale of Union soldiers. A good night’s rest would have helped to alleviate these challenges, but after days of marching and fighting in the elements men often spent their evenings in hard labor. By this point n the war, construction of field entrenchments was an automatic response to movements on campaign, and night offered the safest time in which to construct field fortifications within the range of the enemy. … Construction of field fortifications took a great deal of effort, which was normally expended immediately following a lengthy march and/or preceding an engagement. Yet, as the campaign continued, the men began to realize the power that such entrenchments granted them on the battlefield.” [p .51]
Things got so bad in the later part of the Overland campaign soldiers even refused to follow orders and attack when they felt it was too dangerous. “In this situation, when their commanding officer committed a perceived act of incompetence, the men in the unit took it upon themselves to countermand his orders. When the officer registered his strong objection to their behavior, the men (and apparently even some of the officers) proved willing to use violence to enforce their judgment. … The explanation for such challenges to authority ultimately can be found in the poor conditions that the men faced throughout May and June, but much of it can be seen in the steady decline in the level of faith the enlisted men had in their commanding officers. Company and regimental officers were common targets for accusations of cowardice or incompetence.” [p. 71] In short, the army’s discipline and morale were falling apart, and once they fell it would be only a matter of time before the army collapsed. What saved the army was the Petersburg campaign. “From the middle of June 1864 until almost the conclusion of hostilities, the Army of the Potomac entered into a period of combat operations radically different in size and duration from any of its prior experience. The war went on and the near constant threat of death continued, but living conditions improved for the average Union soldier, and there was at least the perception within the ranks that their chances for survival had improved as well It was the transition to the fighting around Petersburg, and the gradual acceptance of siege life, that began the process of empowering the Army of the Potomac to survive and ultimately to attain victory in one of the longest campaigns of the war. But first the men would have to learn to live in the trenches. … What distinguished the Petersburg campaign from what came before it was the extensive use of field fortifications on the battlefield. The utilization of trench warfare by both sides resulted in a slow and methodical form of conflict where men were generally protected from battlefield projectiles and ‘battles’ (in the context of previous engagements of the war) increasingly gave way to the sporadic sniper and artillery firing that characterized the campaign.” [pp. 89-90]
World War I soldier experiences make us automatically associate trench warfare with horror, but that’s not how Civil War soldiers saw it. “The men recognized the protection that the elaborate breastworks around Petersburg offered them, and their near constant labor on these entrenchments provided ever-increasing benefits to their personal security. The end of active campaigning combined with the men’s ability to construct their own defensive positions to create an increased feeling of independence on the battlefield. No longer did these men consider themselves pawns of their commanders as they had at the end of the Overland campaign; rather, they were once again active participants in a war against the rebellion.” [p. 126] The experience actually revitalized the army. “For those who understood that the static warfare around Petersburg offered them an escape from the open field assaults of the Overland campaign, it was not long before they realized that the work on their entrenchments only added further advantage to their situation. The advantage was noticeable almost immediately, as soldiers identified a dramatic drop in the number of casualties in their units. … They understood that instead of being marched out into the open field for assaults, they now had direct control over their survival by playing a greater part in the creation of their own protection on the battlefield. With this understanding came an increased willingness to participate once again in active, high-intensity combat with their Confederate foe. This was not a change that occurred overnight, however, and many soldiers throughout the campaign would continue to decry the use of open assaults against enemy positions. Yet while Union soldiers seemed unwilling to engage in almost any form of active combat upon their arrival at Petersburg in mid-June, once they settled into the protection of their earthworks the men expressed a desire to once again face the Confederates, but this time from the safety of their fortified positions.” [pp. 140-141]
Professor Sodergren bolsters his conclusions with direct quotes from soldier letter and diaries. He let the soldiers themselves tell us what they were thinking and feeling, making the book a very powerful contribution to Civil War military historiography. This book is really well done, and I can recommend it.
Student of the American Civil War 