Evaluating Lee at Gettysburg Part 7 in a Series

Before we can sensibly evaluate Lee’s performance, we have to understand his objectives–what was he trying to do in the first place?  In his reports on the battle, he wrote the following:

“The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fredericksburg being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army then commanded by General Hooker, and that in any event that army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and, possibly, to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country. In this way it was supposed that the enemy’s plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations, and the preparations that they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success.”  [R. E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, 31 July 1863, OR Series I, Vol 27, Part 2, p. 305]

and:  “Upon the retreat of the Federal Army, commanded by Major-General Hooker, from Chancellorsville, it reoccupied the ground north of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, where it could not be attacked excepting at a disadvantage. It was determined to draw it from this position, and, if practicable, to transfer the scene of hostilities beyond the Potomac. The execution of this purpose also embraced the expulsion of the force under General Milroy, which had infested the lower Shenandoah Valley during the preceding winter and spring. If unable to attain the valuable results which might be expected to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was hoped that we should at least so far disturb his plan for the summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the season of active operations.”  [R. E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, January, 1864, OR, Series I, Vol 27, Part 2, p. 313]

From these two reports we can conclude Lee had the following objectives:

1. Draw the Army of the Potomac away from its Fredericksburg position to a place where it can be successfully attacked.
2. Relieve the lower Shenandoah Valley from Milroy’s troops.
3. Bring the war into the loyal states north of the Potomac.
4. Force the AoP to leave Virginia.
5. Possibly draw troops to support the AoP from other theaters.
6. Disrupt Federal plans for offensives.
7. “Other valuable results” which “might be attained by military success.”

In a letter to James Seddon, Secretary of War, Lee wrote, “As far as I can judge there is nothing to be gained by this army remaining quietly on the defensive, which it must do unless it can be reinforced.  I am aware that there is difficulty & hazard in taking the aggressive with so large an army in its front, entrenched behind a river where it cannot be advantageously attacked.  Unless it can be drawn out in a position to be assailed, it will take its own time to prepare and strengthen itself to renew its advance upon Richmond, and force this army back within the intrenchments of that city.  This may be the result in any event, still I think it is worth a trial to prevent such a catastrophe.  Still, if the Department thinks it better to remain on the defensive, and guard as far as possible all the avenues of approach and await the time of the enemy, I am ready to adopt this course.  You have therefore only to inform me.”  [R. E. Lee to James A. Seddon, 8 June 1863, in Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin, eds., The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee, p. 505]  Lee is a bit disingenuous here, as he already knows Jefferson Davis has approved his plan to take the war north.  He can, therefore, offer to remain on the defensive, knowing that’s what Seddon wants, confident that he won’t have to actually fulfill that offer.

So Lee seeks to bring the war into the loyal states while clearing Milroy out of the Shenandoah Valley while keeping the initiative and keeping the Federals reacting to him.  This might have the effect of forcing the Federals to transfer troops from Mississippi and other places in order to reinforce the AoP or to save Washington in the event he can defeat and scatter or destroy the AoP.  As to what he meant by “other valuable results,” I believe we have a clue in an extremely important (for our understanding of Lee) letter he wrote to Jefferson Davis:

“I beg leave to bring to your attention a subject with reference to which I have thought that the course pursued by writers and speakers among us has had a tendency to interfere with our success.  I refer to the manner in which the demonstration of a desire for peace at the North has been received in our country.  I think there can be no doubt that journalists and others at the South, to whom the Northern people naturally look for a reflection of our opinions, have met these indications in such wise as to weaken the hands of the advocates of a pacific policy on the part of the Federal Government, and give much encouragement to those who urge a continuance of the war.

“Recent political movements in the United States, and the comments of influential newspapers upon them, have attracted my attention particularly on this subject, which I deem not unworthy of the consideration of Your Excellency, nor inappropriate to be adverted to by me in view of its connection with the situation of military affairs.

“Conceding to our enemies the superiority claimed by them in numbers, resources, and all the means and appliances for carrying on the war, we have no right to look for exemptions from the military consequences of a vigorous use of these advantages, excepting by such deliverance as the mercy of Heaven may accord to the courage of our soldiers, the justice of our cause, and the constancy and prayers of our people.  While making the most we can of the means of resistance we possess, and gratefully accepting the measure of success with which God has blessed our efforts as an earnest of His approval and favor, it is nevertheless the part of wisdom to carefully measure and husband our strength, and not to expect from it more than in the ordinary course of affairs it is capable of accomplishing.  We should not therefore conceal from ourselves that our resources in men are constantly diminishing, and the disproportion in this respect between us and our enemies, if they continue united in their efforts to subjugate us, is steadily augmenting.  The decrease of the aggregate of this army as disclosed by the returns affords an illustration of this fact.  Its effective strength varies from time to time, but the falling off in its aggregate shows that its ranks are growing weaker and that its losses are not supplied by recruits.

“Under these circumstances we should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening our enemies that they may feel some of the difficulties experienced by ourselves.  It seems to me that the most effectual mode of accomplishing this object, now within our reach, is to give all the encouragement we can, consistently with truth, to the rising peace party of the North.

“Nor do I think we should in this connection make nice distinctions between those who declare for peace unconditionally and those who advocate it as a means of restoring the Union however much we may prefer the former.

“We should bear in mind that the friends of peace at the North must make concessions to the earnest desire that exists in the minds of their countrymen for a restoration of the Union, and that to hold out such a result as an inducement is essential to the success of their party.

“Should the belief that peace will bring back the Union become general, the war would no longer be supported, and that after all is what we are interested in bringing about.  When peace is proposed to us it will be time enough to discuss its terms, and it is not the part of prudence to spurn the proposition in advance, merely because those who wish to make it believe, or affect to believe, that it will result in bringing us back to the Union.  We entertain no such apprehensions, nor doubt that the desire of our people for a distinct and independent national existence will prove as steadfast under the influence of peaceful measures as it has shown itself in the midst of war.”  [R. E. Lee to Jefferson Davis, 10 June 1863, in Ibid., pp. 507-509]

In this letter, Lee shows his sophisticated understanding that the critical vulnerability of a democratic republic such as the United States is the will of the People to continue the fight.  As the weaker party in the war, Lee realizes that he can’t overcome the Federals in the long run due to their much greater resources.  While some critics may contend he was oblivious to the high casualties his style of warfare was causing, this letter shows precisely that he was not only aware of those casualties, but he was also taking them into account in forming his strategic thoughts.  He realizes his army, and the other armies of the confederacy, are getting weaker while the Federals still have more resources.  He understands that the will of the people in the Northern states must be affected in order to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a recognition of the confederacy’s independence.  I believe this is what he  meant by “other valuable results” which “might be attained by military success.”  A confederate victory in the loyal states will depress home front morale in the Union and will result in an encouragement of the peace movement, possibly to the point where the populace will tire of the war and will force the Lincoln administration to sue for peace.  An earlier letter of Lee’s to his wife, Mary, confirms this:  “If successful this year, next fall there will be a great change in public opinion at the North.  The Republicans will be destroyed & I think the friends of peace will become so strong that the next administration will go in on that basis.  We have only therefore to resist manfully.”  [R. E. Lee to Mary Custis Lee, 19 April 1863, in Ibid., p. 438]

Another “valuable result” of his movement north is suggested by this dispatch to Richard S. Ewell, commanding the Second Corps of the ANV:  “[E]ndeavor to keep yourself supplied with provisions, send back any surplus …”  [R. E. Lee to R. S. Ewell, 19 June 1863, in Ibid., p. 521]  Even more so is this letter to Ewell:  “”You must get command of your cavalry, & use it in gathering supplies, obtaining information, & protecting your flanks.  If necessary, send a staff officer to remain with Genl [Albert G.] Jenkins.  It will depend upon the quantity of supplies obtained in that country whether the rest of the army can follow.  There may be enough for your command, but none for the others.  Every exertion should therefore be made to locate and secure them.  Beef we can drive with us, but bread we cannot carry, and must secure it in the country.”  [R. E. Lee to R. S. Ewell, 22 June 1863, in Ibid., p. 524] From this we can deduce that one of his objectives was to subsist his army in the loyal states in order to relieve the Virginia farmers, around harvest time, of the presence of the two armies, and therefore allow them the opportunity to bring in a crop.  Additionally, sending surplus supplies back to Virginia would allow him to subsist his army on supplies from loyal states even after his raid was completed.  This appears to be a continuation of the desire to relieve Virginia farmers of the burden of supporting the Army of Northern Virginia.

Lee’s objectives, then, appear to show a sophisticated understanding of how war is, in the words of one translation of Clausewitz (which Lee likely never read), the continuation of politics by other means.  They also show his intimate understanding of the condition of both armies, and they show his application of all he had learned regarding the value of the offensive and the fact that remaining on the defensive would end in defeat.